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Non-technical summary
Innovative personnel measures that increase involvement, qualification and
motivation of (non-managerial) employees (so-called high performance workplaces
or just HPW) were extolled as an efficient means to increase firm productivity. The
theoretical literature further stresses the complementarities between these measures.
In practice, it is however noticeable that some measures, such as profit sharing or
employee share ownership have been adopted by a small minority of firms. Despite
the supposed complementarities, only very few firms use the full set of measures or
combinations of some measures. Some authors point to the fact that extensive
organizational changes or incentive contracts may not necessarily provide the
expected results, but may even impair employee satisfaction and hence firms’
performance. Other reasons for the finding that the incidence of high performance
workplaces is smaller than the theoretical literature suggests could be the high
implementation costs, employee resistance against innovations and last but not least
small and uncertain productivity effects.
The empirical evidence on the productivity effects of HPW is not clear either. While
a couple of papers find significant and durable positive effects of HPW on
productivity, several studies are rather sceptical about the productivity impacts. The
differences between the results may be due to measurement problems, limited and
deliberately chosen samples of firms, and the fact that most studies analyse different
sets of personnel measures. We show that unobserved heterogeneity among firms
and endogeneity of the management practices may affect the conclusions
substantially. While unobserved heterogeneity is corrected for in several studies, the
endogeneity problem is ignored in most analyses. The vast majority of the empirical
studies on the productivity effects of HPW refers to Anglo-Saxon countries, whereas
the evidence for Germany is very scarce.
The original contribution of our paper is that we simultaneously account for both
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity using representative and very detailed
establishment panel data for Germany from 1996 to 2000. We find that firms often
introduce specific related bundles of individual HPW measures. One common set of
measures includes the reduction of hierarchies and the introduction of team-work
and independent work groups (denoted here as “organizational changes”). The other
(somewhat less) popular bundle contains profit sharing, employee share ownership
and incentive training as well as training to support the adoption of organizational
changes (denoted as “incentives”). Note that these two bundles represent
independent HPW measures. In order to assess the productivity impact of
organizational changes and incentive systems, taking into account unobserved
heterogeneity and the endogeneity problem, we extend the 2-step panel procedure
applied by Black and Lynch (2001) by instrumenting human resource innovations in
the second step. We find that organizational measures have a positive significant
impact on firm productivity while incentives have no influence. Another interesting
result is that not taking unobserved heterogeneity into account leads to an
underestimation of the productivity effects of organizational changes because
especially firms with structural productivity problems introduce organizational
changes. In contrast, not correcting for selectivity induces an overestimation of the
productivity effects of incentives, because firms are more likely to offer incentives
in times when they are doing well.
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Abstract
High performance workplace practices were extolled as an efficient means to
increase firm productivity. The empirical evidence is disputed, however. To assess
the productivity effects of a broad variety of measures, we simultaneously account
for both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity using establishment panel data
for Germany. We show that increasing employee participation enhances firm
productivity in Germany, whereas incentive systems do not foster productivity. Our
results further indicate that firms with structural productivity problems tend to
introduce organisational changes that increase employee participation whereas well
performing firms are more likely to offer incentives.
JEL Codes: C23, D23, D24, M12
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31 Introduction
Innovative human resource practices are often praised as suitable and effective
means to increase firm’s productivity (Godard and Delaney, 2000; Ichniowski et al.,
1997). The common denominator of most of the personnel measures currently
discussed is the transition from production methods which are characterised by
direct control with fixed pay – often denoted as Fordistic work practices – towards
more participation, indirect control and more flexible, that is performance related
pay. While only few studies analyse the driving forces behind the restructuring
process (see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 2000), more research is done on the
economic consequences of these organizational changes. However, it is still disputed
which human resource measures or bundles of methods have indeed a positive effect
on labour productivity or value added of the firm. Although many managers point to
the productivity potential of innovative personnel management methods, such as
employee participation, training as well as profit sharing or employee share
ownership, several observers stress the difficulties and costs of implementing these
measures and their disappointing productivity effects.
Up to now, empirical studies could not clearly solve the problem whether innovative
personnel management methods are successful either. On the one hand, a couple of
papers deduct a significant positive impact on productivity (see the surveys in
Ichniowski et al., 1997 and Appelbaum et al., 2000). On the other hand, there are
several studies that do not find any significant effects on productivity (see for
example the survey in Godard and Delaney, 2000, p. 491). One possible reason for
these contradicting results could be the broad variety of measures and their multiple
combinations taken into account in different studies – the low productivity effects
are frequently attributed to the fact that not all complementary measures have been
adopted or that basic preconditions have not been fulfilled by the firms.
Furthermore, the evaluation of innovative personnel management methods is
plagued by measurement and estimation problems that pose high requirements on
the data basis. This last point could be one reason why most empirical studies refer
to the situation in Great Britain or the United States, while there are very few studies
considering the German case.1
Apart from the limited empirical evidence for Germany, theoretical arguments
support the necessity for studies referring to German firms, because human resource
practices may display different effects in Anglo-Saxon countries and Germany.
International comparisons frequently reveal that in Germany the relationship
between employers and employees is traditionally based on trust. Furthermore, the
German economy is characterised by high shares of qualified, flexible and indirectly
                                          
1 The German literature on this topic is surveyed in Section 2
4controlled jobs. Roth (1997) states that German employees are in general strongly
committed to their employers and that they are motivated by the product of their
work. Taking into account the large differences between industrial relations, the
education and training system and the wage culture between the Anglo-Saxon
economies and Germany, we cannot assume that innovative personnel methods have
comparable productivity effects in both regions. A work atmosphere which is based
on trust and co-operation could be beneficial to the implementation of a participative
labour organisation. On the other hand, we should expect lower productivity effects
from the introduction of innovative human resource management methods in
German establishments than in traditional Fordistic establishments in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, because on average changes in the labour organisation are smaller.
For Germany, however, representative and comprehensive evidence on the
productivity impact of (bundles of) innovative personnel measures is scarce.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to close this important gap in the literature by
evaluating the productivity effects of organizational changes, training measures, and
monetary incentives using representative establishment panel data.
It is not easy, though, to detect empirically if these selected personnel measures
increase firm productivity, because firms may tend to introduce innovations
depending on their economic situation. The OECD points to this problem as follows:
“If firms only began to experiment with new forms of working practices when they
faced dire trouble, the existence of practices might be associated with poorer
performance, at least over the short-term. On the other hand, if flexible practices
were introduced mainly into firms with more highly skilled workforces, there is the
danger that higher performance may be attributed to the working practices rather
than the higher skills” (OECD, 1999, p. 182). In this paper we show that indeed both
factors, selectivity caused by temporary shocks (endogeneity) and unobserved
structural differences (unobserved heterogeneity) have an impact on the estimated
productivity effects. Thus, we conclude  that studies which do not take both effects
into account may be plagued by biases.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical foundation
of the expected productivity effects of the selected personnel measures. Section 3
summarises previous empirical results on the productivity effects of high
performance work practices. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy that takes
possible endogeneity biases into account. The fifth and the sixth part present the data
basis (the IAB establishment panel) and a descriptive analysis of how many German
firms have introduced selected personnel measures. Section 7 is dedicated to the
estimation results of the production function and shows how endogeneity and
unobserved heterogeneity bias the results. The last section concludes.
52 Theoretical considerations
Even if changes in the work organisation during the last decades are very diverse
and difficult to summarise by a few key words, there is a wide agreement that
employee involvement, training activities and incentive systems are the predominant
changes (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Each of these categories includes a variety of
innovative personnel measures. To enhance the participation of employees, for
example, the firm may use team-work, reduce the number of hierarchical levels or
delegate responsibility to financially autonomous production units. Financial
incentives are often implemented in terms of performance-related wages like profit-
sharing or employee share ownership. Training, however, is a very traditional
measure to raise the skill level of employees and firm productivity. In the wake of
reorganisations towards a more participative work design, training becomes
especially important because employees have to cope with the new job requirements
and skill demands. Furthermore, innovative personnel managers start using training
as a part of an incentive plan. The productivity effect of each measure is not clear in
advance and may change if measures are introduced separately or as part of a
coherent bundle, the so-called high-performance work organisations (HPW),
because there may exist complementarities between the single measures (see
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1996 or
Lawler, Mohrmann and Ledford 1998).2 In the following, we will therefore discuss
the potential consequences of these human resource practices in more detail.
The main principle behind all initiatives to improve worker participation is to get
lower level staff more involved in the decision and work process and grant them
greater autonomy and control over job tasks and methods of work (Cappelli and
Rogovsky, 1994). This increases the necessity of horizontal communication between
front-line employees (Ichniowksi, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). Both, higher
communication and autonomy of non-managerial staff is supposed to be improved if
the work organisation is characterized by (autonomous) teams and flat hierarchies
(Appelbaum et al., 2000). But how may an increased employee involvement raise
firm productivity? Firstly, this strategy takes advantage of the specific knowledge
non-managerial employees have about their own work processes and combines the
skills of a group of workers. Therefore higher participation increases the expertise
used. Secondly, individuals are expected to have a higher identification with their
enterprise and the decisions taken, feel more committed and do a better job
(Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Godard and Delaney, 2000). Thirdly,
employees participating at decisions can balance production more effectively to
eliminate bottle-necks or interruptions of the production process (Appelbaum et al.,
                                          
2 Other authors point to the synergies between re-organisation and the use of new information
and communication technologies (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Bresnahan et al. 1999;
Askenazy, 1999). In this paper we will focus on organsational changes, though.
62000). Fourthly, reducing hierarchies may make some employees of the middle
management redundant and a higher cost autonomy of groups may diminish waste,
inventories, and inefficiencies (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Other observers argue,
however, that organizational changes which are supposed to improve employees´
participation may also decrease participation. A change of tasks, responsibilities and
work structures renders skills obsolete, increases work pressure and may deteriorate
the position of some employees. In addition, organizational changes always induce
adoption costs that have to be incurred before the pay-off can be observed (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1995). If, for example, the returns to reorganisations are small or
highly uncertain for the employees and in particular if the organizational change
endangers their jobs, employees will hamper these changes (Zwick, 2002a).
Owing to these organizational changes, traditional Fordist control measures are put
into question or rendered more costly, because individual effort cannot be measured
easily any more (Kruse, 1993; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1995). Therefore, a coherent set of HPW measures should also contain
indirect methods of control and financial incentives in order to bring the employees´
motives into line with the objectives of the management. One possibility is to offer
employees a share of the rent or the value added in order to stimulate higher effort
and participation in strategic decisions. We therefore deduct that the positive
productivity effect of a participative work organisation may be enhanced by
performance related pay schemes. A crucial proviso is that employees are affected
by both measures, which means in particular that financial incentives are also
provided for non-managerial employees who participate in decisions.
Whether financial incentives increase productivity irrespective of the degree of
employee participation is also not clear, however. There are several theoretical
approaches linking shared compensation schemes, such as profit sharing and
employee share ownership as well as profit related pay, to firm performance
(Conyon and Freeman, 2001). On the one hand, wages that are partly oriented
towards the profit of the firm or payments in terms of firm shares give employees a
material interest in improving the economic situation of the firm (Kruse, 1993). On
the other hand, performance related pay schemes may support free rider behaviour,
because each employee hopes that his or her colleagues work harder to increase the
outcome and the remuneration of the team than he does himself or she does herself.
Especially in larger firms the additional effort is likely to easily outweigh the
additional revenues for co-operative employees. Therefore, incentives may only be
productivity enhancing if they are supplemented by a corporate culture that
emphasises company spirit, promotes group co-operation and encourages social
enforcement mechanisms (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). Also Appelbaum et al.
(2000) point to the fact that performance related pay only makes sense if the
concerned employees have considerable discretion on their effort and decisions.
Furthermore, there is a large literature arguing that material incentives may crowd
7out voluntary co-operation and intrinsic motivation and hence cause
counterproductive effects (Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Deci et al., 1999, Frey
and Jegen, 2000 or Fehr and Gächter, 2001).
Finally, training, for example in the basics of business administration,
communication or seminars about the economic situation of the firm, increases the
competence of the employees and their readiness to engage themselves in the firm
(Ichniowski et al., 1996; Godard and Delaney, 2000). Especially in highly
participative work organisations, continuous training seems to be a necessary
complement to the increased demand for skills of non-managerial staff. We
therefore expect that the productivity effect of measures to improve employee
participation is higher if it is supported by a specific training program for the
empowered employees. On the other hand, training is sometimes used as a sorting
device or as a measure to increase motivation or incentives while productivity-based
objectives play only a minor role. Therefore, it is important to differentiate between
different types of training (Zwick, 2002b)
Considering the extensive and diverse list of potential consequences of high-
performance work practices, it is not clear whether stronger employee participation,
financial incentives or training have a positive impact on productivity. The
theoretical considerations expounded above suggest, however, that there are
complementarities between employee involvement, training activities and incentive
systems, provided that they are implemented properly. Therefore, we expect that
isolated organizational changes have a lower impact on productivity than a complete
new orientation of personnel management (Osterman, 1994; Huselid, 1995;
Ichniowski et al., 1996; Appelbaum et al., 2000).
3 Empirical Evidence
Apart from numerous case studies whose results are not fully applicable to other
firms and sectors, there are – at least for the USA and Great Britain – several
microeconometric studies over the productivity effects of HPW on the firm level. “A
review of available studies suggests that there is a positive relationship between new
work practices and firm level performance” (Arnal et al., 2001). In particular studies
for the US find significant positive productivity effects of high performance
workplaces (Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Godard, 1999, Cappelli and
Neumark, 2000; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Black and Lynch, 2001). Addison et al.
(2000) state that in the UK changes in employee involvement have larger effects
among non-union establishments than for unionised firms and Caroli and van
Reenen (1999) show that the effect of changes in work organisation is strongest in
establishments with a high share of skilled labour. There is also some evidence that
the success is not forthcoming immediately, because employers and employees need
to learn how the new work practices are used effectively.
8While most empirical studies derive positive productivity effects,3 at least for some
of the measures, little evidence supports the hypothesis that there are
complementarities between the measures (Kruse, 1993; Huselid, 1995; Delaney and
Huselid, 1996). Some studies even find, that the interaction terms of the measures in
the production function estimation are negative (McNabb and Whitfield, 1999b) and
thereby indicate that the combined effect is detrimental for productivity.
To our best knowledge, there is no comparable study for Germany on the (joint)
productivity effects of HPW measures and their complementarities. However, some
papers study the productivity effects of single HPW measures. Most of the studies
concentrate on the productivity effects of profit sharing and employee share
ownership (see for instance Hübler, 1995; Jirjahn, 1998; Heywood, Hübler and
Jirjahn, 1998; Fitzroy and Kraft, 1992; Möller, 2000 and Wolf and Zwick, 2002),
while Bellmann and Büchel (2001) and Zwick (2002b) estimate the productivity
effects of training. The impact of measures enhancing employee involvement and
the joint impact of HPW measures in German firms are not evaluated yet.
4 Methodological Remarks on the Empirical Analysis of
Productivity Effects of Personnel Measures
Many empirical studies on the effect of personnel measures on firm productivity are
of limited scope because a selective choice of firms, small sample sizes and item
non-response renders the data non-representative (Godard and Delaney, 2000; Black
and Lynch, 2001). The underlying data often contain information on just a few HPW
measures. As a result, there are only very few studies on the complementary effects
of coherent measures (Cappelli and Neumark, 2000, p. 12). In addition, the list of
measures included changes from study to study and therefore the results are not easy
to compare (Cappelli and Neumark, 2000; Appelbaum et al., 2000).
But even with representative firm data including detailed information on the
implementation of HPW-measures, it is not straightforward to assess their
productivity effects, because the estimation strategy seems to be crucial for the
partly contradictory results. The empirical literature discusses several
methodological problems, which are ignored in many empirical studies, though.
This chapter focuses on the three main problems: multicollinearity of the measures,
unobserved heterogeneity among firms and endogeneity of the measures (OECD,
1999; Dearden, Read and Van Reenen, 2000).
                                          
3 Doucouliagos (1995) demonstrates in a meta-analysis on the relation between employee
participation (in his case participation on decisions and profit sharing and employee share
ownership) and firm productivity that these personnel measures have a positive impact on
productivity.
9As several measures are strongly correlated, it is not easy to attribute the
productivity impact to single measures. McNabb and Whitfield (1999b) show, for
instance, that the productivity effects of human resource practices depend on how
many measures they take into account and the method with which measures are
aggregated to bundles. (Imperfect) Multicollinearity between explanatory variables
leads to large standard errors of the coefficients and consequently the impact of
single HPW-measures can be measured only very imprecisely. Some studies
therefore reduce the number of HPW-dimensions by factor analysis methods
(Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997).
A further problem arises because the choice of certain HPW-measures is possibly
endogeneous (OECD, 1999, p. 182). It seems plausible that a transitory external
shock increases or decreases the productivity of the enterprise and has an impact on
the introduction of HPW-measures at the same time. Dearden, Reed and Van
Reenen (2000) and Zwick (2002b) show for example that firms introduce additional
training measures when they face a temporary negative demand shock. In addition,
Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001) conclude that firms introduce organizational
changes when they are in economic troubles. The introduction of HWP-measures is
therefore no exogenous determinant in the production function (Griliches and
Mairesse, 1995). Another source of endogeneity are the differences in the costs and
benefits of the introduction of HPW-measures. We would expect that only those
firms which expect high benefits or small costs will decide to implement these
measures (Godard, 1999; Godard and Delaney, 2000). If the (generally unobserved)
introduction costs and benefits are correlated with the productivity of the firm, the
decision to introduce the measure is again endogeneous and the estimation biased.
This argument becomes relevant if firms with a high level of organizational capital
benefit more from changes in the work organisation4, and are more productive than
traditional managed firms.
Firms usually do not only differ with respect to the introduction of personnel
measures but also with respect to (frequently) unobservable characteristics like
management quality, the activity of the personnel department or industrial relations
that do not change quickly over time (Huselid, 1995; Wolf and Zwick, 2002). Some
authors argue that firms store and accumulate knowledge that affects their
technology of production (Marshall, 1930; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2002). This often-
called organisation capital is a type of unmeasured capital that is distinct from the
concept of physical or human capital entering classical production functions
(Prescott and Visscher, 1980). If these unobserved characteristics are correlated with
the introduction of HPW-measures and with the productivity of the firm – which
seems to be plausible here – the ordinary least squares method on the basis of cross-
                                          
4 This may be the case because their workers and managers are used to organizational changes
and adopt fast to the new requirements.
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sectional data leads to inconsistent estimation results. The productivity effects of
these relatively stable unobserved characteristics (the so-called fixed effects) can be
controlled for example in a panel analysis.
While unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for in some panel studies on the
productivity effects of HPW-measures (Black and Lynch, 2001), the endogeneity
problem is, according to our best knowledge, ignored in most empirical analyses. In
this paper, we show that both problems may have a decisive impact on the
evaluation of HPW-measures, however.
Our estimation strategy and our data base allow us to solve the three estimation
problems mentioned above all at once. In addition, we present for the first time
panel estimations assessing the productivity effects of various HPW-measures using
representative data on German establishments. Finally, we can illustrate the impact
of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity on the estimation results.
5 The Data
To illustrate the significance of our contribution, it is important to describe the data
of the IAB establishment panel, which we use for the following analysis, in more
detail.5 The establishments participating in this survey are selected from the parent
sample of all German establishments employing at least one employee with social
security. Thus, self-employed and establishments that employ only people not
covered by social security (mineworkers, farmers, artists, journalists, etc.) as well as
public employers with solely federal employees do not belong to the original
sample. The random draw on this sample covers information for almost 14.000
German establishments in the year 2000, of which 5.500 are located in East
Germany.
The establishments covered by the survey are asked about turnover, number of
employees, personnel problems, apprenticeship training, investments, innovations
and public subsidies since 1993 (in East Germany since 1996). From time to time,
additional topics, such as training and personnel measures are added to the
questionnaire. In 1998 and 2000, it was specifically asked, whether during the last
two years responsibility and decisions were transferred to lower hierarchical levels,
and team-work and/or independent work groups were introduced. In 1996, however,
it was asked if these organizational changes have been introduced once. By
combining these informations, we therefore know, if these measures are existing in
the firms or not. Other questions focus on the existence of employee share
ownership and profit sharing programs. Questions on the training activities belong to
                                          
5 A precise description of this data set can be found in Bellmann (1997).
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the standard set of questions. For the year 2000, additional information about the
purpose of existing training programs is available. We selected the relevant training
forms from the list: training for incentive reasons and training induced by
organizational changes. Based on the answers to these questions, covering the main
characteristics of high performance workplaces (Osterman, 1994; Ichniowski, Shaw
and Prennushi, 1997; Appelbaum et al., 2000), we can draw a very detailed picture
on the personnel measures introduced until 1999. As we do not know the date of the
implementation of some of the HPW-measures, we base our evaluation on
differences in performance between firms with and without these selected human
resource practices.
For the purpose of this analysis, we include profit oriented establishments and
establishments that have not been bought by other establishments or bought other
establishments only.6 The variables describing the existing HPW-measures refer to
the year 1999. Our panel estimation includes the years 1996 – 1999. According to
Black and Lynch (2001), a period of 4 years is still short enough to maintain the
assumption underlying within-estimators that the unobserved work-place
characteristics are more or less constant over this period. In 1999, we have 6397
firms in our gross sample while during the years 1996 – 1999, 15839 enterprises are
covered in total.7
6 The incidence of HPW measures in Germany
The survey on the theoretical literature (see Section 2) indicates that there are many
reasons for the supposition that German firms can yield a higher productivity level if
they use innovative organizational measures such as team-work, flat hierarchies,
employee share ownership and profit sharing as well as training.
The main diagonal of Table 1 provides an overview of the incidence of selected
HPW measures in our representative sample for Germany. The most common
measure is with 26% the delegation of responsibility and decisions to lower levels of
hierarchy. The other two measures to enhance employee involvement (team-work
and work groups with independent budget) have been introduced by more than 10%
of the establishments. Training to support organizational change is offered by far
less establishments than incentive training. Employee share ownership is offered by
                                          
6 We sort the establishments into the following sectors: Agriculture and forestry, mining and
basic materials, food, consumer goods, production goods, investment goods, construction,
trade, traffic and communication, credit and insurance, hotels and restaurants, education, health
and social affairs, electronic data processing and research and development as well as business
consulting, other business services, and other personal services.
7 The number of observations in the net sample is shown in the tables with the estimation results.
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1.5% of the firms only, while profit sharing can be found by almost 8% of the
German establishments.
Table. 1: Incidence of HPW measures in 1999 (in %)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 shift responsibility to lower level of
hierarchy
26.0
(100)
2 team-work and self-responsible teams 10.6
(74.3)
14.3
(100)
3 work groups with independent budget 7.8
(66.7)
5.6
(48.0)
11.6
(100)
4 employee share ownership 0.6
(42.7)
0.3
(20.1)
0.3
(19.3)
1.5
(100)
5 profit sharing 3.2
(41.1)
1.6
(20.0)
1.7
(22.1)
0.7
(8.6)
7.8
(100)
6 training to support organizational change 4.2
(55.3)
2.4
(31.3)
2.0
(26.3)
0.4
(5.2)
1.6
(20.3)
7.7
(100)
7 training as incentive scheme 7.3
(52.5)
3.6
(25.7)
3.4
(24.4)
0.3
(2.4)
1.7
(12.3)
3.2
(23.0)
13.9
(100)
8 value added 0.27* 0.23* 0.24* 0.09* 0.17* 0.20* 0.19*
Notes: The figures present the percentage of firms applying a certain HWP measure (based on the
whole population). The figures in brackets describe the percentage of firms that use a certain
combination of HPW measures (based on the number of firms in the corresponding category).
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1999 and 2000, own calculations.
The figures in the lower triangle of Table 1 describe the incidence of different
combinations of the measures. That is, for example 7.8% of the establishments in
our sample aimed at improving the participation of their employees by shifting
responsibility to lower levels of hierarchy and by implementing work groups with
independent budgets. When we only take the group of establishments that introduce
work groups with independent budgets (i.e. set it as 100%) then 66.7% of these
establishments introduce both measures. Team-work and self-responsible teams
have been introduced by 48% of those establishments that have work groups with
independent budgets. Among the firms that implemented team-work and self-
responsible teams, a shift of responsibility to a lower level of hierarchy is also very
widespread. Much smaller is the joint incidence of profit sharing and employee
share ownership. Less than 1% of the German establishments share profits as well as
give employee share ownership. Also the joint incidence of all combinations
between the financial motivation measures and training or organizational changes
are rather low. The percentage of firms which offer all selected HPW measures is
tiny. These findings indicate that most German establishments select only a small
13
number of HPW measures. The EPOC study (Employee Direct Participation in
Organizational Change), a survey on increasing employee participation by
organizational changes in 10 states of the EU in 1996, comes to similar conclusions
(OECD, 1999, p. 200).
Also Osterman (1994), Gittleman, Horrigan and Joyce (1998), Godard and Delaney,
(2000) and OECD (1999, p. 200) cannot identify a dominant combination of HPW
measures. This finding points to the supposition that there must be severe reasons to
introduce only selected HPW measures, even if specific combinations and measures
are regarded as best practice, at least in the theoretical literature (Godard and
Delaney, 2000). It may be argued that the use of specific HPW measures differs
fundamentally by industry or establishment size. Besides some combinations with
team-work, even if we look at the incidence of measures by business sectors or
establishment size groups, we cannot find single personnel measures or a bundle of
measures which is offered by the majority of establishments.
There are a couple of reasons why enterprises are reluctant to introduce sweeping
organizational changes. Godard (1999) argues that first a high level of trust, co-
operation and identification of the employees has to be reached before a
simultaneous introduction of several HPW measures is possible and successful. Job
security and the support by unions and the work committees also play an important
role for the successful implementation of organizational changes (Ichniowski, Shaw
and Prennushi, 1997; Pil and MacDuffie, 1999; Zwick, 2002a). In contrast to firms
in other countries, these preconditions are likely to be fulfilled in a high share of
German enterprises (Roth, 1997). Another reason is that managers may be hostile
against organizational innovations fostering employee involvement, because they
generally loose control and are urged to share their knowledge and power among
workers of lower hierarchies (OECD, 1999). In addition, organizational changes are
often encountered by employee resistance in Germany (Zwick, 2002a). This
especially happens when the mutual trust between employees and managers is low
or the management can not convince the employees that those benefit from the
changes. Another reason for retarding and jeopardising organizational changes are
employment uncertainty and skill obsolescence of skills (Godard and Delaney,
2000; Zwick, 2002a). Many enterprises may be deterred by high implementation or
follow-up costs and introduce the cheap measures first. Furthermore, the success of
organizational innovations may depend on key players within the enterprise and on
the circumstances within the firm (Bailey, 1993). Finally, German firms traditionally
use participative work organisations without calling them team-work or flat
hierarchies. When these firms would formally introduce for example team-work this
would incur substantial costs, the expected productivity effects would be small,
however (Roth, 1997; Godard and Delaney, 2000).
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In accordance with the theoretical expectations, there is a positive correlation
between the value added and the presence of HPW measures (see the last row in
Table 1). This correlation may not be interpreted causally, because the enterprises
with and without HPW measures clearly differ for example with respect to size,
capital intensity and qualification of the employees. If personnel measures still have
an impact on value added after controlling for the main input factors and other
relevant determinants is investigated in the next section.
7 Empirical Analysis of the Productivity Effects of HPW-
Measures
The productivity effects of HPW measures are determined by estimating Cobb-
Douglas production functions (see also Black and Lynch, 2001). The dependent
variable denotes the economic value added (turn over minus input costs) and the
explanatory variables include capital, the number of employees, selected personnel
measures and other control variables. In order to take into account the
methodological problems described in Section 4 and to demonstrate their impact on
the estimation results, we specify six different models.
7.1 Survey on the estimation models
The first model describes a cross-section regression of a simple Cobb-Douglas
production function, where capital stock, labour input, variables describing the
existing human resource practices of the establishment and selected control variables
are regressed on value added. The strong coherence among the dummy-variables
indicating the existence of the personnel measures (see Table 1) is accounted for by
aggregating the observed HPW-practices to two independent factors. These two
factors can be described intuitively by “organizational changes” and “incentives”.8
To illustrate the sensitivity of the estimation results, we define Model 2 as a very
parsimonious specification of the model. Apart from the two bundles of personnel
measures, we include only capital and labour as well as dummy variables for East
Germany and business sectors in the estimation equation. Model 3 contains the same
control variables as Model 1 and additionally an interaction term between both
bundles of HPW measures. This specification allows us to examine the
complementarity of organizational changes and incentive schemes. The purpose of
Model 4 is to analyse the complementarities between all observed human resource
                                          
8 We apply a main component factor analysis to reduce the seven HPW measures to two
independent factors with eigen values above 1 (see also Osterman, 1994). The resulting factors
“organizational changes” and “incentives” explain 43% of the total variance. The factor
loadings and the assignment of the HPW-indicators to the independent factors are shown in
Table A2 in the Appendix.
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practices. Therefore, we include the seven single HPW measures and selected
interaction terms in the estimation of the production function. The endogeneity of
the HPW measures is tackled by instrumenting the two bundles of personnel
measures. Model 1a to 3a are similar to the cross-section estimates in Model 1 to 3,
but use exogenous instruments for organizational changes and incentives within the
establishment.
In order to avoid biased estimates caused by unobserved fixed effects, Model 5 and
6 make use of the panel structure of the data. The first step of the estimation
procedure applied in Model 5 and 5a is a fixed effects panel estimation, which
regresses value added on the time-variant input factors capital and labour. In order to
increase the efficiency of the within-estimation, we use the difference estimator
proposed by Griliches and Hausman (1986) in Models 6 and 6a. In the second
estimation step, the establishment specific fixed effects are explained by the bundles
of HPW measures and the other (quasi) time invariant control variables. While
Model 5 and 6 are based on observed HPW-factors, we instrument these variables in
Model 5a and 6a analogously to the cross-section models. The following section
presents the estimation results and interpretations of the alternative model
specifications.
7.2 Productivity estimations in a cross-section analysis
First, we estimate the productivity effects of the factors “organizational changes”
and “incentives” in a Cobb-Douglas production function for 1999:
1 1 2 2(1) ln ln ln ,Y K L F F X= + + + + +α β γ γ δ ε
Equation (1) describes the production function where Y is value added, K is capital
which is approximated by replacement investments (Möller, 2000; Bellmann and
Büchel, 2001), L is the weighted number of employees, F1 is the factor
“organizational changes”, F2 denotes the factor “incentives”, and X represents the
vector of control variables. The parameters α, β, γ, and δ are the regression
coefficients to be estimated and ε is the normally distributed error term with
expected value zero and variance 2σ .
In addition to the inputs capital and labour, further firm characteristics are added as
explanatory variables, because we expect that a high share of qualified employees,
investments in information and communication technology as well as a modern
technical equipment increase the productivity of the establishment (see for example
Black and Lynch, 2001). In addition, exporters and co-determined firms usually
exhibit  a significantly higher productivity (Jirjahn, 1998). East German
establishments may still have lower productivity and differences between the
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business sectors are captured by 16 dummy variables. A definition of the control
variables as well as their average values can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The first column of Table A3 shows the regression results of Model 1. The
establishments in our sample produce with constant scale elasticities (the sum of
labour and capital productivity does not significantly differ from one) and with a
capital intensity of around 0.15.9 The low and insignificant coefficient of the factor
organizational changes surprises considering the theoretical considerations in
Section 2. Incentives seem to increase the productivity of the establishments,
however. This result is in accordance with Hübler (1995) and Möller (2000).
Therefore the output of an establishment is the higher the more incentives in terms
of training or employee share ownership or profit sharing are offered. The control
variables all have the expected positive effects on the productivity of the enterprises.
The productivity gap between East and West Germany is still persistent and the
productivity differentials between sectors are jointly significant. The results of
Model 2 show that the additional control variables in Model 1 increase the
explanatory power of the regression, but do not have an impact on the qualitative
productivity effects of HPW measures (see Table A3 in the Appendix).
The complementarities between single HPW measures are widely ignored in the
empirical literature (Cappelli and Neumark, 2000). Therefore, we focus on this
aspect in Model 3 and 4. In addition to the independent bundles of personnel
measures, Model 3 contains an interaction term between both bundles. In contrast to
our theoretical considerations – though in accordance with comparable estimations
(McNabb and Whitfield, 1999b) – the interaction term is significantly negative. This
means that establishments that offer incentives to their employees can not further
increase productivity by additionally introducing organizational changes. On the
contrary, our results suggest that the combination of both bundles of measures even
decreases productivity significantly. This sobering result may be a consequence of
the fact that in most German enterprises incentive systems cover only managers,
while participative organisations affect mainly non-managerial employees. High
profit sharing bonuses or generous employee share ownership schemes for the top
level employees may even impair the motivation of the empowered lower level staff.
This hypothesis can not be studied on the basis of our data, however.
In an alternative estimation, we study the productivity effects of single personnel
management measures and their complementarities (Model 4). In accordance with
our theoretical hypotheses, most of the single measures have a positive impact on
establishment productivity. Team-work has a significantly negative impact,
                                          
9 The low capital coefficient may be a consequence of the approximation of capital by
replacement investments. In comparable estimations the capital coefficient has a similar size
(Möller, 2000).
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however, while financially independent subgroups and training as an incentive do
not have any significant impact. Contrary to our theoretical intuition, we only find a
small number of complementarities between the single measures. Only the
interaction between delegation of responsibility and team-work is significantly
positive. Other interaction terms like employee share ownership and profit sharing,
delegation of responsibility and training induced by organisation measures as well as
training induced by organisation measures and training as incentive device are even
significantly negative. This may be a consequence of a bad synchronisation or
implementation of single measures. For example, if most employees work in teams
but the remuneration is oriented at individual effort or profit of the firm, the
productivity impact of this organizational change is expected to be rather limited
(Becker and Huselid, 1998). Another explanation may be that too many changes are
implemented during a relatively short period of time, such that employees reject the
adoption of new arrangements because they may incur a high uncertainty for them
(Zwick, 2002a).
7.3 Endogeneity of HPW measures
The explorative regressions in the last section can give only first indications on
possible productivity effects of HPW measures, because possibly important
unobserved establishment characteristics and endogeneity of the personnel measures
are not taken into account. In a next step, we show on the basis of instrumental
variable regressions that the results presented in the previous estimations are biased
because the choice of HPW measures is endogeneous (Models 1a-3a).
Most data sets do not provide suitable additional variables that meet the
requirements for qualifying them as identifying variables in an instrument
regression. In the case of panel data, lagged values or differences of the explaining
variable in question are often used as instruments.10 The IAB establishment panel
contains further indications on the style of the personnel policy and on expected
personnel problems which may serve as identifying regressors. Finally, we identify
five suitable exclusion restrictions: expected difficulties to find adequate skilled
employees on the labour market11 and four different strategies of the personnel
department to avoid skill gaps.12 Each of these variables is correlated with the
                                          
10 This strategy is however problematic when the instruments are only weakly correlated with the
endogeneous variables (Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000).
11 The dummy variable has value one when the establishment expects problems to find suitable
skilled employees on the labour market. It is based on the question “Which personnel problems
do you expect in the following two years?”.
12 The possible strategies of the personnel department to avoid skill gaps are based on the question
“And how did your establishment react on vacancies for skilled jobs?“. Possible answers are (1)
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introduction of HPW measures because they depict the activity and the expected
problems of the personnel department. On the other hand, the identifying variables
turn out to be uncorrelated with establishment productivity.
The instrument equations for both HPW factors F1 and F2 can be described as
follows:13
1 1 5 5(2) ... with 1, 2,i i i i iF I I X i= + + + + =α α δ ε
where I1 – I5 are the identifying variables and X is the vector of control variables
from equation (1). Equation (2) is now estimated simultaneously with the production
function (1) using the maximum likelihood procedure. This implies that the
endogenous factors, i.e. the factors F1 and F2 that are correlated with the error term
in equation (1) are replaced by the instrumented factors estimated in equation (2), 1ˆF
and 2ˆF . These factors are correlated with the original factors but independent from ε
in equation (1) and therefore exogenous.
The results of the instrumental equation can be found in Table A5. If an
establishment reacts on vacancies for skilled employees by internal job rotation, a
shift of orders to other parts of the establishment or co-operations with other
establishments, it indicates that the personnel department reacts in a rather flexible
way on personnel problems. Establishments that just increase the amount of
overtime work when they face a skill gap are less prone to introduce organizational
changes. The positive correlation between the introduction of the HPW measures
and active strategies of the enterprise to encounter skilled vacancies is therefore not
surprising. We also find that establishments tend to re-organize when they expect
problems with skilled vacancies. Analogous to other studies larger establishments
are more likely to use HPW measures (OECD, 1999). In addition, firms with
investments in information and communication technology and modern technical
equipment also tend to introduce HPW measures more often (compare also
Osterman, 1994). East German enterprises apply significantly less HPW measures,
however. In contrast to Osterman (1999) and OECD (1999), our results point to the
fact that enterprises that face international competition do not differ significantly
from those that only serve local markets. The results for organizational changes and
incentives differ only slightly.
                                                                                                                                         
internal job change, (2) request overtime work, (3) shift jobs to other divisions of the
establishment, (4) implement co-operations between establishments.
13 See also the determinants for the introduction of HPW measures in Osterman (1994), McNabb
and Whitfield (1999a) and OECD (1999, p. 190).
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Table A4 shows the estimation results of the production function of Model 1a to 3a
with the instrumented HPW measures. The coefficients of the input factors capital
and labour and the additional control variables are almost unchanged in comparison
to the estimation results of Model 1 to 3. The estimated impacts of the HPW
measures change, however. The incentive schemes lose their significantly positive
impact on firm productivity while the coefficients of organizational changes are still
not significantly different from zero. Also the interaction term between
organizational changes and incentives does not significantly differ from zero now
(see Model 3a).
This result implies that the positive productivity effects of incentive systems found
in the simple OLS model are a consequence of the fact that firms introduce these
measures particularly when they are successful and enjoy a high productivity level
(see also Jirjahn, 1998 and Wolf and Zwick, 2002). This conclusion seems plausible
when we take into account that employee share ownership and profit sharing can
only motivate employees if there is something to distribute, i.e. if  the firm has a
good profit situation. We can deduce that the choice of the personnel measures is
selective. In this case here, mainly competitive establishments offer employee share
ownership and profit sharing or specific training measures.
The exact opposite can be stated for the combination of both bundles of HPW
measures. The interaction term which was negative without controlling for
selectivity now turns insignificantly different from zero. Also Kruse (1993), who
controls for selectivity effects of profit sharing, does not find complementarities
between profit sharing and other personnel measures, such as autonomous work-
teams, employee involvement or job enrichment. In contrast, we can conclude  that
firms offering incentive systems in addition to organizational changes seem to face
clear productivity gaps. This finding is in accordance with the results in Nickell,
Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001) who show that establishments change their
organizational structure thoroughly when they are in economic troubles.
Following Heckman (1997) or Imbens and Angrist (1994), it may be argued that the
estimated effects of the instrumented HPW measures should be interpreted as local-
average-treatment-effect, that is, the IV-estimator identifies the average effect
induced by variation of the instrument. Hence, the estimated parameters depend on
the instruments. Whether the effect of organizational changes or incentive systems
yield heterogeneous returns can be tested using the control function approach. The
estimation results indicate, however, that the corresponding parameters are not
endogenous random coefficients. Thus, the IV-estimator is appropriate and can be
interpreted as an average treatment effect.14
                                          
14 Estimation results are available upon request.
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7.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Finally, we study the impact of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity on our
estimation results (Models 5 and 6). If unobserved characteristics of the
establishment, such as management quality or industrial relations, are correlated
with both the incidence of HPW measures and productivity, cross-section estimates
will be inconsistent. On the basis of panel data, the coefficients of the production
function and the impact of unobserved characteristics can be estimated consistently
with a fixed effects estimation. A disadvantage of this approach is that the impact of
observed (almost) time invariant factors, such as the industry sector, the existence of
employee co-determination as well as other variables in the production function, can
not be identified, because measurement errors may explain a large part of their
variance (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen,
2000). This feature proves to be a crucial hindrance in our case, because we only
know if an establishment has ever introduced the measures we want to analyse until
1999. Therefore we do not know the exact implementation date and we do not know,
if the measure probably has been abandoned again in the meanwhile and our
variables of interest do not change over time.
We therefore use the two step estimation procedure suggested by Black and Lynch
(2001). In this model, the parameters of the time-variant input factors are determined
by a simple Cobb-Douglas production function on the basis of panel data from 1996
to 1999, while the effects of the (almost) time invariant determinants are regressed
on the fixed effects from the panel analysis in the second step. Therefore the fixed
effects estimation in the first step can be written as:
(3) ln ln ln mit 1996 1999,t t t tY K L tα β υ ε= + + + = −
where υ is the unobserved time invariant establishment specific fixed effect and εt
the idiosyncratic component of the error term. The estimation results of the first
estimation step can be found in table A6 (Model 5). Striking is the low coefficient of
the input capital that has a similar size to that in the comparable estimation in Black
and Lynch (2001), however. If input and output are chosen simultaneously or if
there are measurement errors for the input factors (especially for capital), the within
estimator will be inconsistent and we may observe too low capital intensities in the
production function (Griliches and Hausman, 1986; Griliches and Mairesse, 1995).15
Another reason for the strikingly low capital coefficient may be that firm’s choices
on whether to liquidate or to continue their business generate a selection problem
                                          
15 A remedy for these estimation problems seems possible by using a GMM system estimator
(Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000; Black and Lynch, 2001). The impact of HPW measures
on productivity does not change, however, when this estimator is used instead of the fixed
effects estimation (Black and Lynch, 2001).
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when estimating production functions. Olley and Pakes (1996) illustrate that
estimation algorithms that do not accommodate this choice generate a negative bias
in the capital coefficient.
In order to increase the efficiency of the panel estimation, our sixth model applies
the difference estimator proposed by Griliches and Hausman (1986). This approach
does not only use the simple differences between two subsequent years, but also
two– and three–years–differences are included in the panel OLS regression of value
added (Model 6). The estimation results of the Cobb-Douglas production function
are almost identical to those of the fixed effect panel estimator (see Table A6).
On the basis of these first step regression results, we calculate the fixed effect υ for
every establishment. The fixed effect can be interpreted as the average establishment
specific difference from productivity predicted on the basis of the inputs. This time
invariant variable therefore indicates whether establishment productivity was below
or above the average of the other firms during the observation period. It serves as
dependent variable for the second estimation step. The vector of explanatory
variables in the second step contains all (almost) time invariant establishment
characteristics from Model 1, that is both bundles of HPW measures and all
variables in X:
1 1 2 2(4) .F F Xυ γ γ δ ε= + + +
The estimation results are shown in Table A7. Organizational changes as well as
incentives have a significant positive impact on the establishment specific fixed
effects (Model 5). In comparison to the results of the first model, taking into account
unobserved heterogeneity increases the positive impact of organizational changes on
firm productivity. This suggests that enterprises which induce organizational
changes have unobserved time invariant characteristics that decrease their
productivity. Firms with structural productivity problems therefore try to improve
their situation by changing their organizational structure. If one ignores the impact
of these unobserved fixed effects the measured productivity effect of organizational
changes is too low. Also the significance of the impact of incentives increases. The
significance and relative impact of the other variables on productivity are roughly
the same in Model 1 and 5.16
Final statements on the effects of high performance workplace organisations can
only be made, however, if we control for both unobserved fixed effects and
endogeneity. Therefore, in a next step the HPW measures F1 and F2 in estimation (4)
are instrumented using equation (2), see Model 5a and 6a in Table A7. Analogous to
                                          
16 An exception is the dummy variable for firms with co-determination that now takes very high
values.
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Model 1a, controlling for endogeneity reduces the measured productivity increase of
incentives and their significance. The coefficient of this HPW factor does not
significantly differ from zero in Models 5a and 6a. In contrast to the results in Model
1a the coefficient of organizational changes is now significantly positive (in Model
5a only on a significance level of 8 %). The coefficients of the other explaining
variables are more or less the same. This result proves again that taking account of
selection effects can be decisive for the evaluation of the productivity effects of
personnel measures. When we control for the fact that many firms that restructure
their internal organisation are in a precarious productivity position, the assessment
of these organizational measures is clearly more positive. We also find that the
interaction effect between incentives and organizational changes stays insignificant
when we control for both, endogeneity of HPW measures and unobserved
heterogeneity.17
7.5 Summary of the Estimation Results
In this section, we summarise the estimated productivity effects of HPW-bundles in
the models presented in this paper (see Table 2).
Table. 2: Summary of estimation results
Models 1 2 3 1a 2a 3a 5 5a 6 6a
Organizational changes 0 0 0 0 0 0 + (+) + +
Incentives + + + 0 0 0 + 0 + 0
Interaction term: Org.
changes*incentives
– 0
Notes: “0“ corresponds to coefficients that do not differ from zero at a significance level of 5%;
“+“ denotes significant positive coefficient and “–“ indicates a significant negative impact. Signs
in brackets are only significant at the 10% level.
Simple cross-section analyses suggest that organizational changes exhibit no
productivity effects, while incentives seem to have a positive impact on
establishment productivity (Models 1 and 2). The combination of both bundles
reduces the estimated productivity gains obtained by the use of shared compensation
schemes and incentives by training (Model 3). Once we take into account that firms
are more likely to introduce these incentive schemes when they are doing better
compared to their competitors, no significantly positive productivity effects can be
measured any more, however (Models 1a and 2a). Also the seemingly negative
interaction effects between the two bundles of HPW measures vanish if we apply an
instrumental-variable estimation (Model 3a). Finally, controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity in a panel estimation points to the fact that mainly establishments with
                                          
17 Estimation results are available upon request.
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a structural productivity problem make use of organizational changes fostering
employee involvement. Therefore, we demonstrate that the evaluation of HPW
measures leads to exactly the opposite conclusions after controlling for both,
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity: While incentive systems are
productivity neutral, organizational changes fostering employee involvement
effectively increase the productivity of the establishment (Model 5a and 6a).
8 Conclusions
Despite the ongoing development of new management strategies and the increasing
importance of comprehensive human resource management practices in times when
labour is praised as the most important input factor, the empirical evidence on the
productivity effects of so-called high performance measures is poor, especially in
Germany. The management literature promises highly productive, motivated, and
committed employees, provided they receive incentive compensation, are well
trained and involved in the decision process and the work organisation. The slogans
change so quickly, however, that one cannot help thinking that all these innovations
are not much good and quickly lose their fascination.
The OECD (1999) points to the fact that it is not straightforward to decide whether
innovative work practices tend to produce higher firm performance or not. For the
one thing, firm data with extensive information about the workplace organisation
and its innovation – in ideal circumstances matched employer-employee data – are
required. For another thing, methodological difficulties, caused by the endogeneity
of the decision to introduce organizational changes and unobserved firm
characteristics have to be tackled. In this paper, we therefore assess the productivity
effects of selected personnel measures, based on a representative establishment
panel of German firms.
We show that HPW measures have a positive impact on establishment productivity
in Germany. Especially organizational changes fostering employee involvement –
often denoted as “participatory” work practices – have a significantly positive
impact on productivity. Therefore, the costs and efforts to overcome internal
resistance against team-work, introduction of independent work groups or the
reduction of hierarchies seem to have a positive return. Also noticeable is the result
that especially firms exhibiting a structural productivity gap use these measures to
make their production process more efficient.
Shared compensation schemes in terms of profit sharing or employee share
ownership as well as training opportunities as incentive schemes do not increase
productivity, if we take into account that mainly firms which are doing well offer
these measures. In addition, firms offering both – more participation and incentive
schemes – can not realise an additional productivity push. Considering these
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sobering results, it does not come as a surprise that financial incentives and training
in order to motivate the employees are offered by a small share of German
establishments only. But also the other high performance work practices
investigated here and combinations of them are not established as “best practice”
yet. Summing up, we conclude that innovative human resource practices which
enhance the participation of employees may increase firm performance, but they are
far from being praised as a panacea.
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9 Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables
Variables Average Notes
Value added (lnY) 14.62 Turnover minus inputs, in DM, logs
Capital (ln K) 11.59 Proxy: Investments - expansion investments, in DM, logs
Labour (ln L) 3.44 Nominal labour volume: weekly labour hours *
weighted number of employees (part time employees
are multiplied by 0.5), logs
Shift responsibilities 0.33 Responsibilities and decisions have been shifted to
lower employee levels, yes = 1/no=0
Team-work 0.22 Team-work and/or responsible work groups have been
introduced, yes=1/no=0
Independent work
groups
0.20 Work groups with own cost or result accounting have
been introduced, yes=1/no=0
Employee share
ownership
0.04 Employee share ownership is offered, yes=1/no=0
Profit sharing 0.13 Profit sharing is offered, yes=1/no=0
Training to support
organizational changes
0.19 Training is offered because new organizational
structures require this, yes=1/no=0
Incentive Training 0.19 Training is offered in order to motivate employees,
yes=1/no=0
Share of qualified
employees
0.66 Share of employees with a professional degree on all
employees
Investment in IT 0.79 Investment in information and communication
technology, yes = 1/no = 0
State of technical
equipment
2.06 Technical state of equipment, 1 = completely obsolete, 5
= state of the art
Apprenticeship training 0.46 Establishment offers apprenticeship training, yes = 1/no
= 0
Collective wage
agreement
0.79 Establishment is bound or orients itself on sector or
establishment specific collective wages, yes = 1/no = 0
Exporter 0.25 Establishment exports, yes = 1/no = 0
East Germany 0.60 Head quarter of the establishment is in East Germany,
yes = 1/no = 0
Co-determination 0.32 The establishment is co-determinated, yes=1/no=0
Individual firm 0.26 The establishment is an individual firm, yes=1/no=0
Partnership 0.11 The establishment is a partnership, yes=1/no=0
Publicly listed firm 0.04 The establishment is publicly listed, yes=1/no=0
Note: The averages are derived from the cross section sample 1999.
Source: IAB establishment panel 1999 and 2000.
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Table A2: Rotateda component matrix of factor analysis: Personnel measures
Factor Factor
value
Variables Factor loadingsb
Shift responsibilities 0.77 (0.04)
Team-work 0.77 (-0.04)
Organizational
changes
2.15
Independent work groups 0.71 (-0.02)
Employee share ownership 0.63 (-0.13)
Profit sharing 0.70 (-0.06)
Training to support organizational changes 0.55 (0.21)
Incentives 1.21
Incentive training 0.63 (0.07)
Notes: a The factors have been rotated by promax.
 b In brackets you find the factor loading of the factor not chosen.
Source: IAB establishment panel, wave 1999, own calculations.
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Table. A3: Production function without selection correction (cross section)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Constant 10.212 68.24 9.919 82.01 10.227 69.95 10.151 69.39
Capital .147 11.73 .160 12.66 .147 11.76 .149 11.93
Labour .814 39.93 .901 50.51 .817 40.49 .821 40.63
Qualified empl. (%) .356 5.03 .354 5.01 .348 4.94
Exporter. .179 3.71 .176 3.65 .169 3.51
Investment IT .108 2.47 .104 2.39 .098 2.25
Co-determination .165 3.36 .165 3.36 .148 3.02
State of technical
equipment.
-.074 -3.39 -.074 -3.36 -.075 -3.45
East Germany -.357 -9.57 -.307 -8.52 -.361 -9.74 -.365 -9.78
Individual firm -.296 -6.29 -.287 -6.07 -.278 -5.92
Partnership -.076 -1.38 -.073 -1.33 -.072 -1.32
Publicly listed firm -.099 -1.07 -.081 -.86 -.076 -.80
Org. changes .012 .74 .017 1.05 .022 1.27
Incentives .065 4.25 .079 5.02 .076 4.46
O. changes.* Incent. -.015 -1.44
single HPW measures
Shift Responsibilities .102 2.10
Team-work -.169 -2.55
Indep. work groups .008 .17
Employee share
ownership
.320 2.68
Profit sharing .181 3.37
Training to support
org. changes
.247 3.72
Incentive Training .037 .71
IA1 .193 2.21
IA2 -.290 -1.61
IA3 -.213 -2.40
IA4 -.184 -1.93
16 sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 2033 2037 2033 2033
corr. R2 .87 .86 .87 .87
Notes: The interaction terms IA1 to IA4 are defined as follows. IA1 = Delegation of responsibility
to lower hierarchical levels * Team-work; IA2 = employee share ownership * profit sharing; IA3 =
Delegation of responsibility * Training induced by organizational changes; IA4 = Training
induced by organizational changes * Training as incentive.
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Tab. A4: Production function with selection correction (cross section)
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Constant 10.231 64.74 9.939 72.41 10.112 49.30
Capital .147 11.58 .159 12.01 .158 9.15
Labour .815 21.72 .891 23. 21 .844 17.25
Qualified employees (%) .365 4.87 .307 3.14
Exporter .181 3.63 .159 2.65
Investment IT .113 2.07 .064 .86
Co-determination .173 3.32 .112 1.45
State of technical equipment. -.077 -3.15 -.062 -2.03
East Germany -.359 -7.52 -.300 -6.48 -.405 -6.13
Individual firm -.300 -5.82 -.149 -1.11
Partnership -.070 -1.17 -.022 -.28
Publicly listed firm -.075 -.55 .340 .93
Organisational changes .058 .26 .031 .15 .203 .73
Incentives .003 .01 .102 .48 .191 .65
Org. changes*Incentives -.291 -1.26
16 Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 2033 2037 2033
corr. R2 .87 .86 .82
F-test (27, 2005) 490.87 (19, 2017) 660.50 (28, 2004) 357.15
Notes: Both HPW bundles “Organizational changes“ and „Incentives“ are instrumented. Estimation results
of the instrumental equations for model 1a can be found in Table A5. The analogous results for models 2a
and 3a are almost identical and available from the authors by request.
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Table A5: Instrumental equations
Model 1a Model 5a
Org. changes Incentives Org. changes Incentives
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Constant -.939 -5.86 -.745 -4.41 -.098 -1.05 -.277 -3.07
Capital .027 1.86 .034 2.21
Labour .220 9.72 .152 6.36
Qualified
Employees (%)
.032 0.39 .174 1.99 .191 2.62 .095 1.35
Exporter .076 1.33 .082 1.36 .134 2.39 .225 4.14
IT Investments .283 5.40 .286 5.18 .257 6.43 .426 11.03
Co-determination -.007 -0.13 .096 1.55 .086 1.61 .153 2.95
State of techn.
equipment
-.059 -2.49 -.076 -3.34
East Germany -.150 -3.41 -.189 -4.07 -.191 -4.86 -.116 -3.05
Individual firm .008 0.14 -.026 -0.44 -.075 -1.48 -.106 -2.17
Partnership -.074 -1.13 -.012 -0.18 -.071 -1.18 -.042 -0.72
Publicly listed firm .372 3.84 .925 9.07 .326 3.14 .703 7.01
Firm size 20-199 .309 6.30 .099 2.10
Firm size 200-499 .706 8.25 .276 3.35
Firm size 500-999 1.015 8.15 .218 1.81
Firm size 1000+ 1.383 11.10 .915 7.60
Collective wage
agreement
.101 1.95 .047 0.85 .119 2.61 .088 1.99
Internal  job changes .340 3.54 .248 2.45 .384 4.10 .347 3.84
Overtime work -.221 -2.89 .075 .93 -.179 -2.32 .084 1.13
Shift jobs .596 3.21 .432 2.21 .502 2.81 .488 2.83
Co-operations
between
establishments
.487 2.69 .431 2.26 .434 2.43 .615 3.57
Expected skill gaps .132 2.97 0.125 2.66 .149 3.69 .130 3.34
16 Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 2808 2808 3326 3326
corr. R2 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23
F-test (30, 2777)
30.58
(30, 2777)
28.33
(33, 3292) 31.73 (33, 3292) 31.07
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Table A6: Fixed effects production function
Model 5 Model 6
Coef. z Coef. z
Capital .026 3.13 .024 3.59
Labour .473 9.70 .471 11.81
Year dummy 1997 -.016 -0.86
Year dummy 1998 -.023 -1.19
Year dummy 1999 .010 0.48
Difference 1996/1997 -.025 -1.23
Difference 1997/1998 -.020 -0.99
Difference 1998/1999 .038 2.02
Difference 1996/1998 -0.002 -0.08
Difference 1997/1999 0.040 1.72
Difference 1996/1999 .016 0.65
# Obs. 6927 4575
Corr. R2 .86 .03
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Table A7: Fixed effects estimation, second step
Model 5 Model 5a Model 6 Model 6a
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant -.636 -9.37 -.680 -7.72 13.916 147.45 13.844 100.92
Qualified
employees (%)
.632 11.23 .575 8.07 .928 11.87 .790 7.13
Exporter .246 5.65 .245 4.32 .341 5.62 .307 3.48
Investment IT .091 2.89 .089 1.43 .157 3.57 .096 0.99
Co-
determination
.441 10.66 .439 8.81 .894 15.56 .871 11.24
State of techn.
equipment
-.116 -6.38 -.111 -5.00 -.149 -5.89 -.128 -3.70
East Germany -.410 -13.65 -.360 -8.09 -.437 -10.45 -.309 -4.47
Individual firm -.474 -12.11 -.470 -10.25 -.841 -15.46 -.818 -11.48
Partnership -.084 -1.81 -.067 -1.25 -.131 -2.02 -.090 -1.09
Publicly listed
firm
.178 2.21 .217 1.69 .279 2.49 .280 1.40
Firm size 20-
199
.727 19.16 .624 8.47 2.277 43.17 2.041 17.80
Firm size
200-499
1.386 20.87 1.172 8.11 4.223 45.74 3.725 16.57
Firm size
500-999
1.606 16.53 1.255 5.25 5.078 37.58 4.295 11.54
Firm size
1000+
2.176 22.11 1.839 8.38 6.575 48.05 5.728 16.78
Org. Changes .034 2.49 .414 1.69 .101 5.40 .912 2.39
Incentives .073 5.21 -.152 -0.68 .101 5.19 -.255 -0.73
16 Sector
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 3326 3326 3326 3326
corr. R2 .66 .57 .85 .76
F-test (29, 3296) 224.94 (29, 3296) 174.50 (29, 3296) 645.44 (29, 3296) 400.85
Notes: In Model 5 and 6 both HPW measures are taken directly, in Model 5a and 6a, they are
instrumented. The estimation results of instrumental equation for model 5a can be found in Table
A4. The analogous results for Model 6a are almost identical and available from the authors by
request.
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